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ABSTRACT 
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on United States (U.S.) soil memorialized as 
9/11 served as the catalyst for major reforms in the federal government. Twenty-two 
agencies combined to form the Department of Homeland Security with a mission of 
preventing homeland attacks and reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism. Accomplishing 
this amalgamation has led Federal Emergency Management Agency supported 
emergency management discipline principles and homeland security supported discipline 
principles to create jurisdictional gray areas (JGAs) with stakeholders on a path of 
division in preparedness, training, and command. Defining “all-hazards” placed them at 
opposite ends of the spectrum. The purpose of this research is to determine the presence 
of JGAs, and define “all-hazards.” Case study and qualitative methodologies are utilized 
to examine three cases for JGAs, a disaster, act of terrorism, and an act of workplace 
violence. The results revealed utilizing an incident command system on any of these 
incidents reduces JGAs, Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8) provides a holistic 
approach to disaster and terrorism, and an “all-hazards” incident also requires a 
management component. The recommendations are: 1) further research in reducing U.S. 
vulnerability to terrorism, 2) support to sustain HS as a recognized discipline, and  
3) research that identifies mentally unstable employees prior to acts of workplace 
violence.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The September 11, 2001 attack on United States (U.S.) home soil memorialized today as 
9/11 stands as the deadliest act of terrorism in this nation’s history. The attack changed 
American lives forever, and 13 years post 9/11, it is recognized as the catalyst and 
wakeup call for securing the homeland from future threats and acts of terrorism by 
reducing the nation’s vulnerability. The unprovoked and random nature of an act of 
terrorism psychologically impacts a nation with implicit feelings of uneasiness for many 
of its citizens. The threat of terrorism is seen as equally psychologically impacting as it 
also promotes a nation’s citizens with implicit feelings and uneasiness along with the 
added fear of when the next act, whether successful or not, will occur. A thwarted act of 
terrorism serves notice that counterterrorism measures are either needed or must be 
continued. The global challenge of national security and counterterrorism is primarily the 
responsibility of a nation’s government. Heading up the challenge of national security in 
the United States is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This research explores 
how the determination, and more importantly, the urgency of the nation’s leaders to show 
resiliency, has created jurisdictional gray areas (JGAs) between emergency management 
(EM) and homeland security (HS) disciplines that have consequences to national security.  
HISTORY  
In the wake 9/11, which exposed U.S. vulnerability to terrorist attacks on its 
homeland, the signing of the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 represented the 
blueprint for a nation of resiliency that unified the government and its community 
citizenry while deploying measures of counterterrorism as never seen before. The HSA 
established the DHS by combining 22 agencies with a primary mission of securing the 
United States against attacks on its homeland and reducing its vulnerability. Along with 
supporting organizations and community citizenry, the DHS formed what is referred to 
today as the homeland security enterprise. The enterprise composes strategies of 
implementation for securing the nation against acts of terrorism through intelligence and 
information collection and analysis, counterterrorism strategies and tactics, law 
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enforcement policing, investigating and surveillance, fire service suppression and rescue, 
and emergency medical triage, treatment, and transport. Public safety entities, primarily 
law enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical services, represent the majority of 
first responders to both a disaster, either natural or human-made, and an act of terrorism.  
The management component for a response to a disaster or act of terrorism is the 
responsibility of the emergency management agency within the city, municipality, tribe, 
or state.  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) traditionally provided the 
management component for any disaster, natural or human-made that occurred in the 
United States in which all local and state resources had been expended without 
mitigation, or a major recovery effort was expected from a large loss of life, destruction 
to vital infrastructure components, or any other “all-hazards” emergency that left the 
devastated areas in need of federal assistance. Incidents of national consequence that 
expended all local and state resources to include an act of terrorism were also the 
responsibility of FEMA. The request for federal assistance was made by the affected 
state’s governor, and executed by a presidential declaration in which the provisions of the 
Stafford Act designated FEMA to manage and coordinate all federal resources deployed 
to the city, municipality, tribe, or state granted under this act. The 9/11 attack, which led 
to establishing the DHS, placed management responsibility with this federal agency. Title 
V, of the HSA—Emergency Preparedness and Response, provided the framework for 
emergency responders to respond, mitigate, and recover effectively from not only 
terrorist attacks, but disasters, both natural and human-made, and any incident of national 
consequence. Initial JGA can be found as the HSA of 2002, Title V section 503 (1)—
Functions Transferred, designates management responsibilities to the DHS, while section 
507(1)—Role of Federal Emergency Management Agency, of this same act designates 
FEMA as the lead federal agency for the execution of all functions and authorities of the 
Stafford Act. 
The traditional EM and the emerging HS disciplines have created JGAs in 
preparedness, training, and on-scene command as the stakeholders of both disciplines are 
one in the same. Discipline principles of both EM and HS not only represent the same 
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stakeholders, but the operations often require the same first responders. Adding to this 
complexity is the definition of “all-hazards” by both disciplines. EM defines “all-
hazards” as any incident that is not a disaster, neither natural nor human-made, such as a 
hurricane, earthquake, while HS defines “all-hazards” as an act of terrorism. These 
definitions prompt competing roles for on-scene command and resource allocation. 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8 represents the operational framework of the 
National Preparedness Goal (NPG) along with a broad approach to national and 
community preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery.  
PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to explore how JGAs between EM and HS disciplines 
have consequences to national security. A snapshot 13 years post 9/11 reveals a nation of 
pride and resiliency but also the owner of a complex inwardly focused, national security 
organization. To examine the JGAs between EM and HS disciplines, the researcher 
conducted a case study analysis of Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and 
the Washington Navy Yard shooting. These case studies were selected for the following 
reasons: a) a comparison and contrast between a natural disaster (Hurricane Katrina) and 
an act of terrorism (Boston Marathon bombing and Navy Yard shooting) in preparedness 
of the PPD-8 mission areas, b) first responder actions and responsibilities for an act of 
terrorism to include a bombing and an active shooter, and c) the psychological effects of 
terrorism on the public and its political ramifications. The three cases are qualitatively 
analyzed with the following questions. 
 How and why is the determination made of who is in charge and when? 
 How is an “all-hazards” response defined?—Is it different from a 
terrorism response? 
 How is planning and preparedness performed? 
 Why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a 
concern? 
The goal of the research is two-fold, 1) to determine if JGAs occur between the 
EM and HS disciplines that have consequences to national security, and if found, 2) to 
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present an action-orientated paradigm to address them. Ultimately, the goal of this 
research is to protect the first responders from acts of terrorism, reduce vulnerability to 
future acts of terrorism, and make citizens feel safe at home in knowing consequences to 
national security from JGAs between EM and HS disciplines are being continually 
analyzed, and when discovered, they are collectively addressed.  
METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
The researcher composed an observation checklist matrix to collect data that 
analyzed JGAs between EM and HS disciplines utilizing PPD-8, which represented the 
framework for U.S. preparedness in the five mission areas. The analytical themes 
produced from the matrix represented the qualitative data to support or refute 
consequences to national security that resulted from the JGAs created between the EM 
and HS discipline principles. The researcher’s decision to expand the study from 
qualitative analysis methodology to include case study methodology proved to be a 
limitation on the time to collect, analyze, and report the findings. Other limitations were 
related to the sharing of information and theoretical sensitivity as the researcher served in 
a decision-making capacity during the Washington Navy Yard shooting and with respect 
to victims, their love ones, and the on-going investigation, data collection for this section 
of the research concluded in June 2014.  
EMERGING THEMES 
When analyzing how and why is the determination of who is in charge and when, 
the principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), specifically Incident 
Command System (ICS), emerged in the natural disaster, the act of domestic terrorism, 
and the act of workplace violence. NIMS ICS requires that an identified single incident 
commander (IC) or a unified command (UC) structure be established on all incidents. 
This structure inherently promotes and prompts accountability measures as each 
responder on the scene has a person to whom they report. In analyzing “all-hazards,” the 
principles of the EM discipline indicate that planning and preparedness, and response 
efforts for this type of emergency that is not a disaster, also requires a management 
component due to the amount of resources expected for mitigation. Emerging from the 
 xv
analysis of planning and preparedness utilizing the mission areas of PPD-8 was the 
revelation that first responders and some key stakeholders were the same for EM and HS 
disciplines when it came to training.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings and results, the following recommendations are presented. 
Both EM and HS discipline stakeholders must undertake measures in the area of reducing 
the vulnerability of the United States to threats and acts of terrorism collectively, which 
can be accomplished in numerous ways, such as consensus-reaching stakeholder forums 
and joint training in PPD-8 mission areas that include first responders and community 
citizenry. Measures that support HS as a recognized discipline must be undertaken. 
Sustainability of HS is critical because EM discipline stakeholders view this emerging 
discipline as a competitor as opposed to an ally, as potential terrorists seek the path of 
least resistance, led by the JGAs between them. The probability and vulnerability of an 
act of domestic terrorism is increased in the case of the homegrown terrorists who reside 
daily in this nation’s communities. Research in the area of addressing the mental status of 
U.S. citizens who purchase firearms legally warrants further studying for measures that 
will lead to denial before they commit an act of terrorism on innocent victims who 
viewed them as friendly fellow co-workers.  
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The September 11, 2001, attack on United States (U.S.) home soil memorialized 
today as 9/11 stands as the deadliest act of terrorism in this nation’s history. The attack 
changed American lives forever, and 13 years later, it is recognized as the catalyst for the 
paramount challenge of securing the homeland from acts of terrorism. The war on 
terrorism presents a challenge to this nation as leaders worldwide are faced with 
decisions today that will affect future generations. The apparent randomness of terrorism 
psychologically impacts a nation with the potential to produce future terrorists and fosters 
implicit feelings of uneasiness for many of its citizens. This global challenge is primarily 
the responsibility of a nation’s government. Heading up the challenge of national security 
within the boundaries of the United States is the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).  
The DHS, which is composed of 22 agencies, is tasked with the primary mission 
of securing the nation against terrorism. Along with supporting organizations, and 
community citizenry, the DHS has formed what is referred today as the homeland 
security enterprise. The 9/11 attack also presented America with a challenge of 
resiliency. The realization that terrorists, both foreign and homegrown, were willing to 
give their own lives to take the lives of innocent Americans for their cause had a 
profound impact on America. National security leaders and stakeholders tasked with 
framing and maintaining a secure and safe nation rose to the challenge. Documents 
significant in providing the framework for national security are the National Preparedness 
Goal (NPG), Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8), Stafford Act—Title VI, Homeland 
Security Act (HSA) of 2002, and the Quadrennial Homeland Security Report (QHSR).  
In the aftermath of 9/11, the established emergency management (EM) discipline 
and later the emerging homeland security (HS) discipline became recognized as the 
leaders in the primary mission of securing the nation from terrorism. The responders and 
stakeholders of both disciplines were often one in the same whether the incident was a 
disaster or an emergency of national consequence. Operating within the principles of 
their respective disciplines, the common goal was to reduce vulnerability to acts of 
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terrorism on the homeland. Also included in the goal was to increase the response, 
mitigation, and recovery capabilities of the United States in the event of a terrorist attack 
or a disaster, either natural or human-made. The discipline principles of both EM and HS 
disciplines initiate national security measures in the communities across the nation. The 
approach to preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery required a hazard assessment of the type of incidents most likely 
to occur in the community. A hazard assessment was developed from these types of 
incidents with a primary goal of making its citizens self-sustainable until state and federal 
resources arrived. Within the community preparedness approach and framework, 
terrorism would be categorized as an “all-hazard” emergency that required a management 
component.  
A. DEFINITIONAL DISCUSSION 
Discipline for this research is defined as a recognized domain in academia and 
industry; jurisdictional for this research is defined as the range of authority; and gray area 
for this research is defined as ambiguity supporting theoretic and applied differences in 
policy and procedure.  
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on this nation, responding, mitigating, and 
managing disasters—both natural and human-made or any emergency of national 
consequence—was the primary mission of Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA). This previous delegation is significant because disasters, both natural and 
human-made or an “all-hazard” emergency, such as an act of terrorism, entitled the 
affected communities and areas to receive federal assistance as outlined in the Robert T. 
Stafford Act–Title VI–Emergency Preparedness. EM discipline principles provided the 
framework for disaster response, mitigation, recovery, and emergency planning and 
preparedness while FEMA served as the lead agency for managing those efforts. The 
9/11 terrorists attack prompted the signing of the HSA of 2002, which created the DHS. 
The HSA provided the framework for the DHS to execute the mission of preventing and 
recovering from terrorist attacks while reducing vulnerability to future threats and acts.  
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Title V of the HSA-Emergency Preparedness and Response provided the 
framework for emergency responders to respond effectively to terrorist attacks, major 
disasters, and other emergencies of national consequence with the DHS serving as the 
lead agency. The emerging HS discipline and its principles are supported by the DHS in 
the same manner as the traditional EM discipline and its principles are supported by 
FEMA, which has created jurisdictional gray areas (JGAs). Community emergency 
planning and preparedness, national preparedness and response, and all-hazards response 
are three areas that present a challenge for the stakeholders of both disciplines that is 
explored by the researcher for JGAs. 
The U.S. concern of vulnerability to a terrorist attack will continue while EM and 
HS discipline stakeholders of both disciplines travel down a path of division on funding, 
resource allocation, and on-scene command. “That is the core of asymmetric attack: 
avoid areas of redundant strengths, identify areas of weakness, and then exploit them.”1 
The 9/11 terrorist attack will forever be recognized as the U.S. wake up call to the 
challenge of national security and resiliency, but it will also be forever recognized as the 
wake up call for realizing that terrorists were willing to undergo extreme measures to 
execute an act of terrorism. Hurricane Katrina will forever be recognized as the U.S. 
wake up call to the consequences of natural disaster devastation when planning and 
preparedness efforts are not properly addressed by the various levels of government with 
a responsibility to act. With both, the disaster and the emergency, a community approach 
to planning and preparedness is warranted.  
1. Community Emergency Planning and Preparedness  
Emergency planning and preparedness starts in the community. This approach 
encourages input from the community’s residents who will be called on to address 
collectively the planning and preparedness, and response in the wake of a disaster or “all-
hazards” emergency. Title VI of the Stafford Act, Emergency Preparedness, outlines an 
organized approach utilizing local, state, and federal resources. The governor’s activation 
of the affected area’s state emergency operations plan along with a declaration served as 
                                                 
1 Donald Kettl, System under Stress 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), 85. 
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the catalyst for federal officials to conduct a preliminary damage assessment (PDA) 
jointly to assess the impact of the disaster or emergency.2 An assessment confirming 
significant impact to life, the infrastructure, or other debilitating emergency determined 
by the team would qualify for a Presidential declaration request. It also served notice that 
all local, state, and mutual aide resources had been expended and a federal response was 
required. Once signed by the President of the United States, this declaration entitled the 
affected area to federal assistance that augmented local, state, and mutual aide efforts.  
Planning and preparedness efforts are consensus-reached based on the type of 
disaster or emergency likely to occur, from which the community’s priority list is 
established. Problematic to this approach is an act of terrorism will not make the top of 
the priority list in most communities; therefore, planning and preparedness efforts will 
not be undertaken even though an act of terrorism with the potential for national 
consequences can occur in almost any community. Washington, DC, and New York City 
represent a contrast to this paradigm, as they both are considered prime targets for a 
terrorist attack as opposed to many other cities. Hurricane Katrina, a natural disaster, 
provided an example of this problem when it proved to be a planning and preparedness 
failure at the community/local level that resulted in national consequences, as was 
evident to the millions who viewed the lives of New Orleans residents literally being 
swept away when the levees failed. This natural disaster began in communities in which 
the likelihood of an occurrence surely placed it above an act of terrorism on the priority 
list for planning and preparedness.  
Opposing the opinion that Hurricane Katrina was a natural disaster are those who 
believe the failed levees made it a human-made disaster. The human-made disaster 
opinion can be further supported if the flooding that resulted from the failed levees was 
not considered while composing the community’s priority list. Regardless of whether 
Hurricane Katrina was considered a natural disaster or a human-made disaster, a 
community assessment should have justifiably placed both types of disasters at the top of 
the list. The Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006, which among the major 
                                                 
2 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288, as amended 
and Related Authorities, FA 592 (2007). 
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changes it represented, also points to the lessons learned in the lack of community 
planning and preparedness.3 
PPD-8 represents the operational framework of the NPG and provides a broad 
approach in planning and preparing to secure the nation that encompasses the 
community. In accomplishing this task of national preparedness, PPD-8 mandates that the 
core capabilities of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery be 
addressed through a top-down mode of delivery with the Secretary of Homeland Security 
responsible for coordinating the domestic all-hazards preparedness efforts of all executive 
departments and agencies. In consultation with state, local, and territorial government, 
nongovernmental organizations, private sector partners, and the general public, the task 
of developing the national preparedness goal is addressed.4 Stakeholders that represent 
federal, state, and local government, private, and nongovernmental organizations are 
tasked with delivering the collaborative efforts of planning and preparedness to the 
communities. Citizens have an important role in this process by forming community 
emergency response teams (CERTS) composed of the same stakeholders who are its 
residents. The model is built on securing the nation one community at a time.5 PPD-8 is 
similar to Title VI of the Stafford Act in that it involves the community coming together 
for a consensus built preparedness plan that addresses the disasters and emergencies 
likely to encounter, which, in turn, represents the conceptual framework for the 
community’s emergency plan. Preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery are the same whether the disaster is 
natural, human-made, or an act of terrorism. PPD-8 is distinguished from the Stafford 
Act-Title VI in that it is not triggered by a declaration, but it is still FEMA’s management 
responsibility in the event of a catastrophic disaster or act of domestic terrorism.  
                                                 
3 Keith Bea et al., Post-Katrina Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina: A 
Summary of Statutory Provisions (CRS Report No. RL33729) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2006). 
4 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness (Washington, DC: 
The White House, 2011). 
5 Homeland Security Act of 2002—Title I. 2002, 107th Cong. (2002). 
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2. National Preparedness and Response 
The 9/11 attacks led to 22 agencies forming the DHS with a primary mission of 
preventing, preparing, and responding to terrorism attacks within the United States.6 U.S. 
prevention and preparedness efforts to terrorism had become a concern among national 
security leaders and stakeholders before the 9/11 attacks. “Some policymakers and 
emergency management professionals worried that the devastation from man-made 
disasters, particularly terrorist-caused disasters, would match or exceed the scale of 
damage caused by natural disasters.”7 With the Cold War era behind the United States, 
the thought of an act of terrorism on the homeland was unwelcomed and relevant mainly 
to those in positions with national security responsibility. “Support for traditional civil 
defense declined, but in the 1990s terrorism was increasing. FEMA had just undergone a 
complete reorganization early in the Clinton administration and FEMA’s leadership had 
no appetite for additional responsibilities and obligations in matters of terrorism.”8 The 
World Trade Center bombing in New York on February 26, 1993, and the Alfred P. 
Murrah Building bombing in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, brought attention to 
domestic terrorism by foreign and homegrown terrorists but not enough to effect the 
changes, such as reorganizing the government in the aftermath of 9/11.  
Presidential Decision Directive-39 (PDD-39), the U.S. Policy on 
Counterterrorism, which pre-dated 9/11, provided the nation with a mission-specific 
framework for designated federal agencies in the war against nuclear, biological, 
chemical (NBC) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism.9 An inherent 
problem with this directive was the ambiguity it created in the implementation and 
reimbursement for local and state governments, and provisions for law enforcement 
intervention. The signing of PDD-39 on June 21, 1995 by President Clinton came two 
months and two days after the Murrah Building bombing.10 The April 19, 1995, date of 
                                                 
6 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness, 2011. 
7 Richard Sylves, Disaster Policy & Politics-Emergency Management and Homeland Security 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 67. 
8 Ibid., 56. 
9 The White House, Presidential Decision Policy 39 (Washington, DC: The White House, 1995). 
10 Ibid. 
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the bombing was considered significant in that it marked the two-year anniversary of the 
Waco, Texas, stand-off in which 75 members of the Branch Davidian religious sect died 
in an encounter with law enforcement agencies. The Department of Justice (DOJ) served 
as the lead agency for federal agencies under PDD-39 and delegated responsibility for 
threats and acts of terrorism to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The provisions 
of PDD-39 also assigned FEMA as the lead for all federal agencies of the Federal 
Response Plan (FRP) and allowed the American Red Cross to function as a federal 
agency to coordinate mass care in the event of a disaster or emergency declared under the 
Stafford Act. Emergency management principles and policy along with local, state, and 
federal resources constituted the framework for this broad and fragmented national 
disaster emergency response plan, which was officially adopted as the FRP in 1992.  
The FRP could also be implemented for a response to the consequences of or an 
act of terrorism involving a NBC or other WMD as set forth in the provisions of PDD-39. 
The unified federal response prompted the activation of the law enforcement-led WMD 
Contingency Plan, which added the Terrorism Incident Annex to the FRP in 1997.11 The 
conceptualized PDD-39 featured crisis management principles captured from the federal 
plans developed as emergency operation plans at the local and state level. PDD-39 also 
incorporated consequence management principles captured from the FRP framework that 
supplemented those same federal plans. The WMD Annex applied to all federal agencies 
that would be expected to respond to a threat or act of terrorism on the homeland. The 
major concept of PDD-39 was crisis management versus consequence management.  
Crisis management started narrow with law enforcement discipline principles, 
which were headed up by the FBI and expanded to include support for NBC or WMD 
terrorism threats and acts; however, it excluded local and state support for the 
consequences to life and property in the event of a threat or attack. Consequence 
management started broad with support to local and state government for the 
consequences to life and property resulting from the threat or an act of terrorism 
involving a NBC or other WMD and narrowed its scope but included a threat assessment; 
                                                 
11 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Response Plan, Notice of Change (Washington, 
DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1997). 
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however, it excluded law enforcement. PDD-39 represented crisis versus consequence 
management principles and division in the same manner that EM and HS disciplines have 
created JGAs. A return to PDD-39 and its practical application would represent a 
regression in the war against terrorism in the United States. Furthermore, the need to 
address the JGAs between EM and HS disciplines is proving to present a challenge that 
will require national focus, as a failure to do so can have consequences to national 
security, which could ironically be an act of terrorism in which a NBC or other WMD is 
used in the attack.  
Public safety organizations whose firefighters, emergency medical technicians 
(EMTs), and police officers were the first to respond to both the World Trade Center and 
Murrah Building bombings, were also among the first to realize planning and 
preparedness efforts that addressed terrorism required just as much if not more national 
attention as disasters. The government reorganization after 9/11 placed FEMA under the 
direction of the DHS. The responsibility of planning and preparedness training of the 
nation’s first responders was already a task being conducted by FEMA under the 
provisions of the Stafford Act Title VI–Emergency Preparedness. After 9/11, training for 
public safety-first responders incorporated scenarios in which an unplanned event, such 
as a terrorist attack, was added to encourage the firefighters, EMTs, and law enforcement 
officers to think outside the box of the traditional natural or human-made disaster 
planning and preparedness training. The emergence of the HS discipline in response to 
9/11 has seen planning and preparedness efforts focus primarily on terrorism. This 
paradigm shift creates a JGA in national planning and preparedness training as public 
safety-first responder efforts have incorporated terrorism while community-training 
efforts address disasters and emergencies likely to occur in that community based on its 
assessment. Communities in cities, such as this nation’s capital of Washington, DC, and 
New York City, which are home to iconic landmarks, such as the Capitol and the World 
Trade Center complex, represent prime targets for terrorists to launch an attack. An 
assessment that does not take into consideration the vulnerability of the surrounding 
communities of these landmarks is problematic as a terrorist attack in these cities can 
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have national consequences. Having this knowledge could be advantageous to terrorists 
in considering a high-impact target for an act of terrorism.  
3. All-hazards Response 
Responding to a disaster, natural or human-made, is an essential component of the 
first responder mission. They arrived in the affected communities and areas to perform 
the objectives of life safety, stabilization, and property conservation. These objectives are 
not specific to any one public safety discipline as first responders from law enforcement, 
fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and EM work together during a disaster. The 
expertise of the EM discipline serves as the disaster management component. “In some 
localities disaster management was a political football fought over by police and 
firefighters, both of whom wanted primary jurisdictional authority in emergency and 
disaster circumstances.”12 Responding to an emergency, such as a bombing, is also an 
essential component of the first responder mission. In likeness to a disaster, this 
emergency also requires addressing the same objectives of life safety, stabilization, and 
property conservation for mitigation. Again, the expertise of managers of the EM 
discipline serves as the coordination component by virtue of managing experience with 
both disasters and emergencies. This practical application is also the standard when the 
public safety-first responder disciplines train together on the mission objectives. The 
focus of training is preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, 
mitigation, response, and recovery.  
The events of 9/11 changed the way the United States would respond to and 
prepare for a catastrophic emergency of national consequence, such as a terrorist 
bombing. The 9/11 attacks prompted the defining of terrorism as an “all-hazards” 
emergency by HS stakeholders.  
This change occurred while disasters, both natural and human-made, remained 
true to defining a hurricane, earthquake, and tornado, or a human error event. Problematic 
is the definition of “all-hazards” as the disciplines of EM and HS have created JGAs. EM 
discipline principles define “all-hazards” as an event not considered a disaster, such as a 
                                                 
12 Sylves, Disaster Policy & Politics,12. 
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hurricane, earthquake, or human-made error, while HS discipline principles define “all-
hazards” as an act of terrorism. This change prompts competing roles for on-scene 
command, and resources allocation between the stakeholders of both disciplines.  
C. BACKGROUND AND NEED 
National preparedness attention was re-focused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. With 
the end of the Cold War era, which had prompted the rise of civil defense 51 years 
earlier, the U.S. focus on national security became more of the mission of armed military 
forces under the direction of the Department of Defense (DOD).13 9/11 placed the focus 
back on national security, but with a new dilemma, the categorization of emergencies that 
were determined to be acts of terrorism. The traditional EM discipline would now 
compete with the emerging HS discipline, which by virtue of a government shake-up and 
demonstration of resiliency, saw agencies come together and form the DHS with a top 
priority of securing the nation against terrorism. The new dilemma also gave rise to “all-
hazards,” which seemed to define any catastrophic emergency not a natural disaster, such 
as a hurricane, flood, earthquake, or human-made, such as the Three Mile Island accident. 
1. Challenges in Emergency Planning and Preparedness  
Planning and preparedness for the temporary loss of critical infrastructures, such 
as electricity and communications, requires a management component to ensure that a 
systematic approach is taken that addresses the logistics for restoring these essential 
services. The safety and accountability of those responsible for performing these tasks in 
the wake of a disaster or emergency of catastrophic consequence also requires a 
management component. The Reorganization Plan transmitted to Congress on June 19, 
1978 by President Carter that established FEMA, gave the agency responsibility for the 
consolidation of all emergency preparedness, mitigation, and response activities to 
disasters and emergencies in the United States.14 A JGA has developed in emergency 
planning and preparedness as stakeholders who would be expected to execute the 
                                                 
13 Michael K. Lindell, Ronald W. Perry, and Carla Prater, Introduction to Emergency Management 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 27. 
14 Sylves, Disaster Policy & Politics, 56. 
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emergency preparedness objectives of mitigation, and response under EM discipline 
principles implemented by FEMA, are now expected to implement those same objectives 
utilizing HS discipline principles under the direction the DHS, which are similar in 
management and implementation. This duplication of efforts by the disciplines can result 
in a missed area of responsibility in national security that allows well-trained opportunist 
terrorists, such as the U.S. trained pilots of the 9/11 attacks, to cause harm in 
communities while the stakeholders of both disciplines remain at odds over preparedness 
planning. “Moreover, the redundancies could actually open the door to well-planned 
attacks: terrorists could avoid the areas where the government has created defense in 
depth and seek the areas where defense is much thinner.”15  
2. Challenges in National Preparedness 
Preparing the nation for disasters and emergencies ideally starts at the local level 
in communities that comprise the municipalities, cites, towns, counties, and tribes. The 
state resources augment the efforts of those levels of government for preparedness 
planning. “Plans represent the operational core of preparedness and provide mechanisms 
for setting priorities, integrating multiple entities and functions.”16 National preparedness 
efforts were enhanced through Homeland Security Presidential Directive #5 as this 
doctrine set the parameters for achievement with “a consistent nationwide approach for 
Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of the cause, 
size, or complexity.”17 The systematic approach to national preparedness for public 
safety-first responders training incorporates the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS). “The NIMS represents a core set of doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, 
and organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative incident 
                                                 
15 Kettl, System under Stress, 85. 
16 Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (FEMA 501) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2004), 35. 
17 Ibid., ix. 
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management at all levels of government.”18 The NIMS is applicable to a wide range of 
users who primarily represent public safety organizations.  
Challenges are seen when applying NIMS components of preparedness, 
specifically, Incident Command System (ICS), in community preparedness training 
exercises. Citizens for the most part are not familiar with the modular organization of 
ICS, which requires a top-down approach to managing the incident. Challenges are also 
occasionally found in preparedness training exercises between the first responders of 
public safety organizations. These challenges range from who is in charge of the scene to 
disturbing the crime scene while performing life-saving extrication and medical 
intervention. The differences in EM discipline principles favored by fire and emergency 
medical service organizations and the HS discipline principles favored by law 
enforcement sometimes emerge during public safety-first responder organizations joint-
training exercises.  
Productive training sessions by fire departments from different jurisdictions have 
resulted in positive outcomes during multi-jurisdiction responses and incident scenes. A 
consensus agreed commitment between the disciplines to prepare and respond utilizing 
the principles of ICS, which defines who is in charge, fosters a working relationship that 
can reduce this JGA.  
3. Challenges in All-hazards 
Responding to disasters both natural and human-made throughout the nation is a 
task executed by first responders. Firefighters, EMTs, and law enforcement officers 
perform in hazardous conditions resulting from hurricanes, flooding, tornados, and 
earthquakes. “All-hazards” emergencies traditionally represented any response not 
labeled as a disaster but required a component to manage the resources. “Even before 
9/11, under all-hazards emergency management, all levels of government had been in the 
business of preparing for and responding to acts of terrorism inside the United States.”19 
                                                 
18 Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, ix. 
19 Sylves, Disaster Policy & Politics, 4. 
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The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act mandated the federal government prepare and 
provide response capabilities to major metro jurisdictions.  
Along with the other measures taken to secure the nation against another act of 
terrorism like 9/11, such as enhanced first responder training and preparedness, the 
United States began to deploy an aggressive counterterrorism campaign. This paradigm 
shift saw disasters become secondary to terrorism. Challenges developed because 
stakeholders of the EM discipline prepared and responded to disasters, such as 
hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes, while HS discipline stakeholders prepared and 
responded to the same disasters, which were labeled “all-hazards” emergencies.  
A consensus agreed upon definition of all-hazards would reduce JGAs as the  
principles of both disciplines; specifically on-scene command, resource allocation, and 
mitigation strategies, would be coordinated between EM and HS with the implementation 
of NIMS ICS.  
D. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this research is to explore how JGAs between the EM and the HS 
disciplines have consequences on national security. A snapshot 13 years post 9/11 reveals 
a nation of pride and resiliency but also the owner of a complex inwardly focused, 
national security organization. The disciplines have created JGAs that have consequences 
on national security as the stakeholders of both who are one in the same often have 
competing roles and responsibilities that can create opportunities for terrorists, such as 
the lax pilot training oversight that allowed the 9/11 terrorists to learn how to fly planes 
in the United States only to use them as a weapon against innocent people. The public 
safety organizations that represent the first responders will continue to see its workers 
exposed to unknown dangers from acts of terrorism while they perform their primary 
mission of life safety, stabilization, and property conservation. Complicating national 
security efforts is defining “all-hazards” by the stakeholders of both disciplines. A 
collectively arrived consensus on the definition of “all-hazards” and a clear 
understanding of its implications for both intervention and non-intervention must be 
adopted for effective and efficient implementation of preparedness in the mission areas of 
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prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery, whether due to an act of 
terrorism or a disaster, natural or human-made. Moreover, awareness of U.S. 
vulnerability resulting from JGAs between the EM and HS disciplines must take on a 
national spotlight of priority.  
To examine JGAs between EM and HS disciplines, the researcher conducted a 
case study analysis of Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the 
Washington Navy Yard shooting. These case studies were selected for the following 
reasons: a) a comparison and contrast between natural disaster (Hurricane Katrina) and an 
act of terrorism (Boston Marathon bombing and Navy Yard shooting) preparedness in the 
mission area of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery, b) first 
responder actions and responsibilities for a bombing and an active shooter, and c) the 
psychological effects of terrorism on the public. The three case studies are qualitatively 
analyzed with the following questions. 
 How and why is the determination made of who is in charge and when? 
 How is an “all-hazards” response defined?—Is it different from a 
terrorism response? 
 How is planning and preparedness performed? 
 Why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a 
concern? 
The researcher examines the case studies for comparison and contrast in 
preparedness and responding to a disaster (Hurricane Katrina) and an act of terrorism 
(Boston Marathon bombing and Washington Navy Yard shooting).  
The goal of the research is two-fold, 1) to determine if JGAs occur between  
the EM and HS disciplines that have consequences on nation security, and if found,  
2) to present an action-oriented paradigm to address the nation’s vulnerability to acts of 
terrorism. Ultimately, the goal of this research is to protect the first responders to 
disasters and other emergencies of significance by requiring on-scene managing and 
make Americans safe at home.  
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E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 What are the consequences to national security of JGAs between EM and 
HS, and how can they be resolved? 
 Do the JGAs between EM and HS present a challenge for both disciplines 
in the preparedness mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery? 
 Do the JGAs between EM and HS present a challenge for both disciplines 
for an “all-hazards” response? 
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study will provide educators, stakeholders both internal and external, and 
EM and HS practitioners, with the framework to examine JGAs that exist between the 
two disciplines. Promoting and advancing both disciplines in academia and industry 
while they attain recognition and sustainability globally accomplishes this goal. The 
ultimate goal of this study is to provide the pathway for unity between the disciplines that 
will produce safer incident scenes for first responders to disasters, both natural and 
human-made, and all-hazards emergencies of national consequences, and thus, reduces 
the vulnerability of U.S. national security.  
G. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The limitations of the study are sensitivity to data collection and shared as open-
source, time constrains for analyzing the collected data, and the limited number of case 
studies in this area of research. The Washington Navy Yard shooting case study 
contained theoretical sensitivity as the researcher served in a decision-making capacity 
during the incident. The Washington Navy Yard shooting also continued to reveal 
information about the shooter during the production of this research. Readers of the study 
can interpret this information as biases although the researcher offered this case study for 
the lessons learned regarding first responder actions to incidents involving an active 
shooter.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature review for this research set out to examine studies on JGA between 
EM and HS disciplines. No such studies exist, which makes this research important as it 
is filling a gap in the literature. Literature was reviewed from the following national 
recognized documents for comparison and contrast: NPG, PPD-8 preparedness mission 
areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery, the Stafford Act, Title 
VI–Emergency Preparedness, the HSA of 2002, Title V–Emergency Preparedness and 
Response, and the QHSR. Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the 
Washington Navy Yard shooting case studies provided the analytical tool to examine 
both disciplines with the questions, a) how and why is the determination made of who is 
charge and when? b) how is an all-hazards response defined? Is it different from a 
terrorism response? c) how is preparedness and planning performed? and d) why should 
social, political, and psychological consequences be a concern? This research is 
important as JGA between EM and HS disciplines have consequences on national 
security.  
1. National Preparedness Goal 
A secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the 
community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recovers 
from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.20 
….National Preparedness Goal, September 2011…. 
 
The NPG provides a comprehensive strategy for preparedness to address threats 
and vulnerabilities to this nation. The NPG brings the collaborative efforts of local, state, 
tribal, federal governments and non-government organization stakeholders together to 
address the goal of preparing this nation through the achievement of core capabilities. 
The core capabilities represent the mission areas of preparedness that both the EM and 
                                                 
20 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2011). 
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HS disciplines are expected to achieve. With emphasis placed on preparing for hazards 
that are expected to occur, terrorism preparedness does not figure dominantly in the 
equation of communities across the nation. According to Vaughn, “Terrorism is a hazard 
of uncertain probability for most communities and organizations.”21  
The EM discipline principles support the preparedness mission areas of 
prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Prior to 9/11, FEMA led all 
national preparedness efforts in these mission areas. The birth of the DHS in response to 
the 9/11 attacks shifts the primary focus of preparedness in the mission areas to terrorism. 
Some EM experts see terrorism as not only requiring a community preparedness 
approach similar to disasters, but also returning to the civil defense model.  
David Wagman sees the civil defense days of preparedness efforts returning. 
According to Wagman (2003), 
The heightened emphasis on preparing to deal with terrorist threats since 
Sept. 11 is returning emergency management to its roots in the Civil 
Defense days of the ’40s, ’50s and ’60s. During those years, Civil Defense 
efforts involved community vigilance and local preparation to guard 
against the perceived threat of foreign invasion. As worry over that threat 
waned, emergency management focused more on natural disaster planning 
and recovery. That focus was codified with creation of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency in 1979.22 
In examining incidents that predate the 9/11 terrorist attacks and shift the EM 
focus from community preparedness for natural disaster planning and recovery to “all-
hazards” community preparedness, the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 
the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, were both seen as a wake up call. In the case of 
Oklahoma City’s Alfred P. Murrah Building bombing, the perpetrators were American-
born citizens.  
                                                 
21 William L. Waugh, “Terrorism and the All-Hazards Model. IDS Emergency Management,” Online 
Conference held June 28–July 16, 2004, accessed May 17, 2014, www.training.fema.gov.emiweb/down 
loads/waugh%20. 
22 David Wagman, “Emergency Management and Civil Defense,” in Homeland Security: Best 
Practices for Local Government, ed. Roger L. Kemp (Washington, DC: ICCA, 2003), 7. 
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PPD-8 encompasses many of the NPG preparedness objectives with tasks that 
must be performed in the event of an act of terrorism or a disaster.  
2. Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8: National Preparedness 
This directive is aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the 
United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the 
greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, 
cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.23 
….Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness…. 
  
PPD-8 outlines a holistic community preparedness approach to securing the 
nation. “The national preparedness system shall be designed to help guide the domestic 
efforts of all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and the public to 
build and sustain the capabilities outlined in the national preparedness goal.”24 This 
holistic approach to national preparedness allows all stakeholders to assist in securing the 
nation one community at a time. Preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery is initiated at the local level as the greatest 
risk assessment starts at home. Stakeholders in communities across the nation share the 
responsibility by planning for the kind of disasters likely to occur.25 This approach 
requires the stakeholders of the community to come together and analyze the disasters 
likely to occur. Based on the results, an emergency plan is then developed. The 
emergency plan addresses terrorism, as an “all-hazards” disaster with a framework 
indicative of the EM discipline. “Emergency plans never, or virtually never, cover 
everything that might be required in a disaster.”26 JGA between the two disciplines can 
result based on the objectives that will need to be addressed. In the area of preparedness, 
the objectives of mitigation and response must be addressed regardless of whether it is 
performed utilizing EM or HS discipline principles. As Glen Woodbury stated, 
                                                 
23 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness (Washington, DC: 
The White House, 2003). 
24 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness, 2011. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Waugh, “Terrorism and the All-Hazards Model. IDS Emergency Management.” 
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“Therefore, unless those duties and tasks are clearly separate and distinct, conflict 
between the emergency management and homeland security principles will occur.”27 
Principles of both disciplines are applicable to emergency preparedness. 
3. Robert T. Stafford Act—Title VI—Emergency Preparedness 
The Federal Government shall provide necessary direction, coordination, 
and guidance, and shall provide necessary assistance, as authorized in this 
title so that a comprehensive emergency preparedness system exists for all 
hazards.28 
….Robert T. Stafford Act—Title VI—Emergency Preparedness…. 
  
The Stafford Act defines an emergency as “any occasion or instance for which, in 
the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and 
local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and 
safety, or to lesson or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.”29 
This broad definition provides an umbrella for both disciplines to operate independently 
with their own principles of emergency preparedness and ambiguity.  
Title VI of the Stafford Act sets out to “provide a system of emergency 
preparedness”30 that encompasses local, state, and federal resources. Prior to the 9/11 
attacks the provisions of all components of preparedness, mitigation, response, and 
recovery were core responsibilities of FEMA. The Stafford Act served as the declaration 
policy for affected areas to receive federal assistance with FEMA providing the 
coordinating oversight. This arrangement is seen as problematic today for EM 
practitioners of the discipline, as post 9/11 and the emergence of HS as a discipline have 
created JGA. At the national level of government in which the stakeholders are one in the 
same, the EM discipline, which traditionally received support and guidance from FEMA 
                                                 
27 Glen Woodbury, Emergency Management in Higher Education—Current Practices and 
Conversations “Emergency Management and Homeland Security: Exploring the Gray Area” (Fairfax, VA: 
Emergency Management Agency, 2010).  
28 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Title VI. 
29 Ibid., 1. 
30 Ibid., 59. 
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under the provisions of Title VI of the Stafford Act, now finds itself in a complex and 
challenging identity crisis mode of operation. “The HSA caused a restructuring of 
emergency management to begin. FEMA’s role remains to be determined.”31 
4. Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 
The primary mission of the Department is to prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States; reduce the vulnerability of the United States to 
terrorism, minimize damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist 
attacks that do occur within the United States.32  
….Homeland Security Act of 2002…. 
 
The HSA of 2002 created the DHS, and on January 24, 2003, operations of this 
agency began. The HSA provided the framework for the United State to execute the 
mission of preventing and recovering from terrorist attacks while reducing vulnerability 
to future threats and attacks. Title V–Emergency Preparedness and Response, provided 
the framework for emergency responders to respond effectively to terrorist attacks, major 
disasters, and other emergencies. Principles of the HS discipline are supported by the 
HSA in the same manner as EM discipline principles are supported by FEMA. In 
displaying resiliency to the attacks of 9/11, a shift from all-hazard disaster management 
to a primary mission of combating terrorism occurred that has impacted both disciplines 
as Richard Sylves has observed. According to Sylves (2008),  
The reorganization merged together agencies (or parts of agencies) with 
very diverse organizational structures, missions, and cultures, and 
importantly, diverse ideas about the management of domestic threats and 
emergencies. In the emergency management arena, the overall effect of 
the reorganization has been to expand the role of defense and law 
enforcement-oriented agencies concerned exclusively with terrorism while 
diminishing the role and decreasing the prestige of organizations 
conducting all-hazards emergency management.33  
                                                 
31 Lindell, Perry, and Prater, Introduction to Emergency Management, 27. 
32 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Washington, DC: Department 
of Homeland Security, 2002).  
33 Sylves, Disaster Policy & Politics, 70. 
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This shift is also represented by the QHSR, which provides the framework for the 
U.S. strategic response to terrorism. 
5. Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
By describing a forward-looking homeland security vision for the Nation 
and the requisite set of key mission areas, goals, objectives, and outcomes, 
integrated across the breadth of the homeland security landscape, it will 
also serve as a roadmap to keep America safe, secure, and resilient in the 
years ahead.34 
….Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report…. 
 
The QHSR outlines the strategic framework for all practitioners and stakeholders 
of the HS enterprise to achieve a secure and resilient nation. This framework is not 
dictated by the EM or HS discipline, but instead encompasses the principles of both. As 
much as the QHSR provides the framework for a nation of resilience, it adamantly 
expresses that it is not a resource prioritization document nor does it detail the agency’s 
roles and responsibilities.35 The QHSR provides recommendations for the HS enterprise 
to strengthen the nation through five mission areas. Mission #1–Preventing Terrorism  
and Enhancing Security primarily favors principles of the HS discipline while Mission 
#5–Ensuring Resilience to Disasters primarily favors principles of the EM discipline. 
This favoritism is problematic as the stakeholders of both disciplines who are one in the 
same support the QHSR mission areas of the HS enterprise even though the list of 
priorities indicate HS discipline principles rate higher than EM discipline principles. 
“Hurricane Katrina powerfully illustrated the overall impact of weak preparedness and 
response in the face of extreme natural disasters.”36 An “all-hazards” emergency or “all-
hazards” disaster presents a challenge for both disciplines, as a JGA is formed based on 
this definition. 
                                                 
34 Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report-A Strategic 
Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010), vi. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 2. 
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6. All-hazards 
Responding to disasters, both natural and human-made, is part of the mission of 
first responders throughout the nation. They arrived in the affected communities and 
areas to perform the objectives of life safety, stabilization, and property conservation. 
These objectives are not specific to any discipline as first responders from law 
enforcement, fire, EMS, and EM work together during an “all-hazards” response. The 
expertise of managers of the EM discipline serves as the coordination component. This 
practical application is also the standard when the disciplines train together on the 
mission objectives. Preparedness for an “all-hazards” disaster is the primary focus of 
training. The emergency is usually an unexpected sudden resource challenging “turn of 
events” placed in the training scenario to encourage the participants to “think outside the 
box” in that something unexpected, sudden, and resource challenging, such as a terrorist 
attack, must always be considered. The 9/11 attacks impelled the focus from disaster to 
terrorism, while “all-hazards” continued to constitute any emergency, which is 
problematic as defining “all-hazards” by the disciplines creates JGAs.  
Terrorism provides a challenge for both EM and HS disciplines as an “all-
hazards” disaster or emergency. A traditional response by the EM discipline focused on 
the mission areas of response and recovery to a disaster while the HS discipline focused 
on these same areas to a terrorist attack. The “all-hazards” response to a terrorist attack 
requires addressing the same core capabilities in the same mission areas as a disaster. The 
basic framework required to manage a disaster can be applied to the terrorist attack as the 
objectives that must be achieved: life safety, stabilization, and property conservation do 
not change. “What the “all-hazards” approach can contribute to the effort to deal with 
terrorism in its many forms is a basic framework for structuring the emergency response, 
preparing for the response, and recovering from attacks.”37 In the aftermath of the Boston 
Marathon shooting, which was an act of terrorism, the city of Boston received federal aid 
courtesy of a disaster declaration.  
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B. SUMMARY 
The literature review for this research examined national recognized documents: 
NPG, PPD-8, Stafford Act–Title VI, HSA of 2002–Title V, and the QHSR to analyze 
JGAs between the EM and HS disciplines. Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon 
bombing, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting case studies provided the analytical 
tool for examination with a series of questions to determine whether JGAs have 
consequences for U.S. national security. The definition of “all-hazards,” whether used in 
conjunction with an emergency or a disaster, is problematic, as it triggers preparedness 
planning and a response in the mission areas that have stakeholders of both disciplines 
competing and promoting redundancy. Hurricane Katrina, a disaster, lacked planning, 
preparedness, and response capability to execute the first responder mission of life safety, 
stabilization, and property conservation effectively, while the Boston Marathon bombing, 
an act of terrorism, was a Presidential declared disaster that made it eligible for federal 
relief. The Boston Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013, also unprecedentedly marked 
the DHS and FEMA jointly announcing and coordinating relief efforts. These case 
studies were also chosen because they present a contrast and comparison analysis for the 
stakeholders of EM and HS disciplines to examine incidents to which both should be 
expected to plan, prepare, respond, mitigate, and recover that require clear guidelines for 
on-scene command-who is in charge, resource allocation, and most importantly, 
management.  
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III. CASE STUDY 1—HURRICANE KATRINA 
Hurricane Katrina is seen as a horrendous natural disaster in which all levels of 
government—local, state, and federal—performed inadequately in their individual and 
collaborative roles of responsibility. The failure resulted in lives lost and the question of 
whether the United States could prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover from a 
disaster, natural or man-made, or any catastrophic incident of national significance. 
Having been tested in preparedness and response capabilities four years earlier with the 
terrorist attacks memorialized as 9/11, the question of lessons learned from it echoed 
publicly in outcries throughout the nation. Given the fact that Hurricane Katrina was a 
predicted natural disaster as opposed to an unexpected act of terrorism, such as 9/11, and 
the challenges presented were fundamentally the same, a nation lacking planning, 
preparedness, response, and command showed up at the worst natural disaster in U.S. 
history.  
The likelihood of a Hurricane Katrina-type natural disaster had been forecasted 
and feared by FEMA emergency managers. “It was the worst-case fear of emergency 
planners-precisely the storm about which FEMA planners had worried in 2001 and for 
which they had conducted major exercises just the year before.”38 The chaotic domain 
this nation was forced into on 9/11 served as a warning notice that its nation’s 
preparedness and response efforts to a disaster or an act of terrorism were extremely 
inadequate. “But despite the clear warnings and the recurring drills to prepare the nation, 
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39 Ibid., 5. 
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This case study examines the following questions the researcher considers 
paramount to determining if gray areas exist between the EM and HS disciplines. 
 How and why is the determination made of who is in charge and when? 
 How is an “all-hazards” response defined—is it different from a terrorism 
response? 
 How is planning and preparedness performed? 
 Why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a 
concern?  
The DHS’s 2005 National Response Plan (NRP), replaced in 2008 by the 
National Response Framework (NRF), and the FEMA regulated Stafford Act, which had 
been adopted in the late 1970s, were both documents that presented the framework to 
address disasters and terrorism by bring the local, state, tribal resources under one unified 
command (UC). “The new Department of Homeland Security, with FEMA tucked inside, 
was designed to help the nation respond better to major disasters. The inescapable 
conclusion was that it failed its first test.”40 As the horror of Hurricane Katrina was being 
witnessed globally, so too was the issue of leadership, specifically, who was in charge? 
“Citizens want strong leaders who can help them understand the threats they face and 
what they can do about them.”41 The differences between local, state, and federal leaders 
during Hurricane Katrina were televised around the world. The slow federal response was 
attributed to who is in charge and when, along with the question of leadership. The 
requests for federal help by those thought to be in key leadership positions to make them 
during the hurricane and subsequent flooding went unanswered for far too long. Donald 
Kettl noted this situation in his analysis of the inadequate federal response to Hurricane 
Katrina. According to Kettl (2007), 
Compounding the rising criticism was FEMA’s sluggish response. Gov. 
Kathleen Blanco said later, “I asked for help, whatever help you can give 
me.” Mayor Nagin was more salty. On his Internet telephone line, he told 
President Bush that “we had an incredible crisis here” and that his flying 
                                                 
40 Kettl, System under Stress, 12. 
41 Ibid., 15. 
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over in Air Force One did not do justice. The next day, he went on a local 
radio station to complain about the tepid federal response.42 
The primary concern of who is in charge of an incident of national consequences 
or a natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina, is command of the incident and 
management of on-scene resources. The NRP, which had replaced the FRP, served as the 
operational document during Hurricane Katrina. Critical to note is the NRP shifted 
leadership from FEMA to the DHS. Blame for the failed federal response centered on the 
lack of leadership from both the DHS and FEMA. “In the critical days before landfall, 
DHS leadership mostly watched from the sidelines, allowed FEMA to take the lead, and 
missed critical opportunities to help prepare the entire federal government for the 
response.”43 The counter argument to this assertion was the new emerging HS discipline 
favored by the DHS, which by virtue of the NRP was responsible for providing 
leadership, lacked the expertise to command a disaster of the magnitude presented by 
Hurricane Katrina. “Without a systematic training and implementation effort, the NRP 
was unlikely to be widely or readily understood, and unlikely to offer effective guidance, 
just four months after its implementation, for the massive federal, state, and local 
response necessary for Katrina.”44  
Hurricane Katrina proved to be one of the worst natural disasters in U.S. history. 
The devastation caused by this natural disaster left no one in New Orleans untouched 
either personally, financially, and equally important, emotionally. “Hurricane Katrina has 
shown the world how vulnerable the United States is to natural disasters.”45 The 
devastation caused by this natural disaster underscored Mother Nature’s ability to render 
destruction without being provoked. Planning and preparedness efforts for Hurricane 
Katrina were well documented to be inadequate despite the numerous predictions of a 
natural disaster in the form of a hurricane that would devastate the Gulf Coast. “Long-
                                                 
42 Ibid., 67. 
43 United States Senate, Hurricane Katrina-A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, DC: United 
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44 Ibid., 551. 
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term warning went unheeded and government officials neglected their duties to prepare 
for the forewarned catastrophe.”46 The lack of planning and preparedness touched every 
level of local and state government in Louisiana. Katrina seemed to be underestimated in 
the amount of devastation it could cause the Gulf Coast. “Despite the understanding of 
the Gulf Coast’s particular vulnerability to hurricane devastation, officials braced for 
Katrina with full awareness of critical deficiencies in their plans and gaping holes in their 
resources.”47 Vulnerability should be addressed because the potential risk and 
consequences have been identified. Although natural disasters, such as Hurricane 
Katrina, cannot be measured in totality of destruction, planning and preparedness is still 
warranted. “In order to achieve adequate preparedness for disasters, multiple levels of 
planning are needed.”48 In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the risk of inadequate planning 
and preparedness proved costly for those with decision-making responsibilities and 
deadly for over 1,000 of New Orleans’ most vulnerable. “Without cars or money and no 
buses to rescue them, they were left to fend for themselves or die.”49  
The political fallout from the ineffectiveness at the local, state, and federal levels 
to prepare and respond to Hurricane Katrina proved costly with blame directed at 
everyone who had a role or responsibility in leadership, decision making, and operations. 
The Committee on Government Affairs chaired by Maine Senator Susan Collins 
produced a bipartisan report in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that was critical of the 
government.50 FEMA’s director during Hurricane Katrina, Michael Brown, came under 
scrutiny for his lack of leadership. “Moreover, FEMA’s former Director, Michael Brown, 
lacked the leadership skills that were needed.”51 The criticism of DHS leadership was 
also publicly scrutinized for its lack of urgency regarding preparedness in the days before 
the catastrophic destruction, which resulted from Katrina’s landfall and subsequent 
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flooding when the levees failed. “DHS leadership failed to bring a sense of urgency to the 
federal government’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina, and Secretary Cheroff himself 
should have been more engaged in preparations over the weekend before landfall.”52 
Hurricane Katrina brought to light social inequality that was echoed by those 
impacted directly and indirectly. Viewers of media coverage in the United States had a 
choice of deploying either tacit acknowledge, lying eyes, or acceptance with or without 
guilt for the social disparity picture captured in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. “Perhaps 
the most disturbing fact that Hurricane Katrina Survival has placed before our eyes is our 
society’s loss of faith in its ability to truly help the people whose faces we glimpsed in 
September.”53 Survival seemed to be based on race, and social economic status. “In the 
flood waters of Hurricane Katrina everything about the social, economic, and racial 
injustice of American society floated to the surface.”54 Neighborhoods of the affluent 
were less devastated by flooding, as they were located at a higher altitude. David 
Wellman noted that Hurricane Katrina painted a vivid portrait of the social economic 
state of New Orleans during and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina’s devastation. 
According to Wellman (2005),  
Hurricane Katrina did much more than crumble levees, put houses where 
highways used to be and turned streets into canals. She also rearranged the 
sociological landscape along the Gulf Coast. Katrina made the normal 
problematic, the inconspicuous conspicuous, and the invisible visible.55  
The psychological consequences of a natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina, 
can be long term for survivors with cases of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
survivor syndrome.56 Family displacements and love ones lost in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina left some survivors depressed as the reconstruction of their lives 
presented a monumental task compounded by a feeling of distrust for a nation that left its 
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most vulnerable to fend for themselves in their attempt to survive. The Uniformed 
Services University located in Bethesda, Maryland analyzed the need and requirements to 
address the mental health and care of Hurricane Katrina survivors.57 According to the 
Uniformed Services University (2005), 
Mental health planning and care delivery to evacuees from Hurricane 
Katrina and other disasters requires a 1) public health approach for 
populations, 2) treatment delivery for expected normal rates of all 
psychiatric illness in the population, 3) care for trauma related disorders, 
4) care for emerging disorders such as substance withdrawal and 
associated medical conditions with psychological consequences and 
perhaps most importantly, 5) community building.58 
The questions of how and why a determination is made of who is in charge of a 
natural disaster equaling the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina was answered by reviewing 
the operational guidelines of NIMS ICS. “The NIMS provides a set of standardized 
organizational structures-such as the Incident Command System (ICS), multiagency 
coordination systems, and public information systems.”59 The ICS requires the first 
arriving unit to establish command. In establishing command, the question of who is in 
charge is addressed for the initial responders to a disaster. In addressing the concern of 
who is in charge by implementing the ICS, the question of why a determination is made 
also answered the question of not doing so, which can create an incident scene in which 
tactical decisions are made by multiple initial responders that promotes a duplication of 
efforts, and more importantly, an unsafe incident scene. This scenario would be 
problematic for first responders to both, a disaster either natural or human-made or an 
“all-hazards” emergency requiring a management component.  
The question of how an “all-hazards” response is defined and whether it is 
different from a terrorism response was answered in that Hurricane Katrina met the 
criteria for a natural disaster as an unprovoked act of nature. FEMA headed up the federal 
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response with EM principles of response, mitigation, and recovery while defining the 
disaster as an “all-hazards” emergency requiring a component of coordination and 
management.  
The numerous documented accounts of inadequacy in this area at the local, state, 
and federal levels of government answered the question of how planning and 
preparedness to Hurricane Katrina was performed. Inadequate planning and preparedness 
measures led to the lack of resources required for the size, scope, and complexity of 
Hurricane Katrina despite the warnings of Hurricane Katrina’s anticipated devastation.  
The question of why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a 
concern was answered by the negative press and public outcry received in each of these 
areas, which served notice of a nation dissatisfied with the response and leadership. 
Hurricane Katrina led to key decision makers and those with authority and responsibility 
during the hurricane and subsequent flooding to face national scrutiny. Numerous cases 
of PTSD have been documented among survivors of Hurricane Katrina. Political 
consequences that resulted from the inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina have led to 
changes and reforms, such as the provisions of the Federal Emergency Management 
Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina.  
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IV. CASE STUDY 2—BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING 
On April 15, 2013, attendees and spectators of the annual Boston Marathon were 
the targets of two homemade pressure cooker bombs that detonated 12 seconds apart.60 
The bombings killed three and injured over 250 innocent victims. In the days that 
followed, two brothers, Tamerlin and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, would be identified as the 
terrorists who concealed and planted the bombs near the finish line.  In the days 
following the bombing an intensive manhunt was undertaken to capture the brothers.  
According to reporters of the Boston Globe (2013), 
In more than 100 interviews with police, government officials, residents, 
and tourists who witnessed the week’s events, Globe reporters sought to 
reconstruct the actions of law enforcement agents between the April 15 
bombing that killed three people on Boylston Street and the capture 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev seven miles away in Watertown on April 19 after his 
brother Tamerlin was killed, the conclusion of an epic 102-hour manhunt 
that left one police officer dead and another badly injured.61 
The two Chechen-ethnic brothers who resided legally in the city of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, executed the bombings categorized as an act of domestic terrorism 
because they occurred on U.S. soil, with precision. In the days following, Russia 
denounced the bombings and pointed out that although the brothers were of Chechen 
ethnicity, they were radicalized in the United States. The undetected ease with which the 
brothers were able to plant the bombs that killed and injured innocent victims in the 
United States is relevant to this research if a JGA between the EM and HS disciplines 
creates an opportunity for this type of terrorism. It warrants a probe for a possible 
existence, and more importantly, if found, of a determination of whether it presents a 
consequence to national security. This case study examines the following questions the 
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researcher considers paramount to determining if gray areas exist between the EM and 
HS disciplines. 
 How and why is the determination made of who is in charge and when? 
 How is an “all-hazards” response defined—is it different from a terrorism 
response? 
 How is planning and preparedness performed? 
 Why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a 
concern?  
The annual race attracts runners and spectators who represent nations from around 
the world. Started in 1987, it is always held on Patriot’s Day, the third Monday in April 
and attracts up to 500,000 attendees and spectators. Law enforcement serves as the lead 
in terms of who is in charge in a UC structure that also includes fire and EMS disciplines. 
HS security discipline principles favored by law enforcement are paramount in the event 
of a bombing. The need for securing the crime scene and apprehending the terrorists 
simultaneously requires coordinated planning and preparedness among the law 
enforcement organizations along with the other first responder disciplines. The fostered 
inherent working relationship with first responders of the fire service and emergency 
medical services disciplines allow life safety concerns to be addressed, which includes 
treating and transporting the injured while carefully preserving the active crime scene for 
law enforcement. Also paramount to performing these tasks is not assisting any on-scene 
terrorists trying to escape during the chaos. 
Stakeholders from both the EM and HS disciplines plan and prepare for “all-
hazards” emergencies that would include an act of terrorism, such as the Boston 
Marathon bombing. Preparedness training for both disciplines requires addressing the 
first responder mission of life safety, stabilization, and property conservation. Disaster 
planning and preparedness for first responder disciplines would encompass terrorism, as 
the same challenges would have to be addressed. Both EM and HS discipline principles 
would define this “all-hazards” incident as an act of terrorism requiring a management 
component. While HS discipline principles would dominate in the response arena, EM 
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discipline principles would mirror these efforts with an “all-hazards” response. 
“Emergency management appears to be the “applications” side of disaster policy.”62  
Political concerns in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing were 
magnified by reports that intelligence officials in Russia had informed the United States 
in 2011 that Tamerlin had become a radical follower of Islam.63 After the bombing 
suspects had eluded apprehension, a revisit of the crime scene via close circuit television 
camera revealed troubling images. It showed the brothers calmly walking into the crowds 
of chaos to an unchallenged escape from the scene. The search for the brothers led to a 
daylong lockdown, which was highly criticized. The lockdown also led to public 
comments about civil liberties violations. The psychological effect of this act of terrorism 
and the lockdown had ramifications that reached beyond the city of Boston and took 
center stage as an incident of nation significance.  
The psychological effects of the Boston Marathon included feelings of fear by 
those in attendance and outrage and anger by those who watched the bombings from 
remote locations aired by media coverage and social network outlets. Fueling the anger 
was the revelation of the two brother’s affiliation with Islam. For many in the United 
States, the memory of the 9/11 attack was rekindled as the bombing was executed by 
terrorists who claimed to be inspired by Al Qaeda. Adding to the anger and outrage of 
America was the August 2013 cover page of Rolling Stones magazine that featured 
Dzhakhar. Some felt the magazine glorified the alleged terrorist and delivered another 
hurting blow to the recovering citizens of Boston while some in the Muslim-American 
community felt it further strained their contentious relationship with U.S. citizens that 
resulted post 9/11. According to Baig (2014), 
Boston will heal, but an ugly scar will remain and the people of Boston 
will bear the brunt, especially young Muslims who have no malintent 
                                                 
62 Sylves, Disaster Policy & Politics, xvii. 
63 Peter Finn, Carol F. Leonning, and Will Englund, “The Suspects—Chen Refugees Build Lives in 
U.S.,” Washington Post, April 20, 2013, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-34547642.html. 
 36
against America and are here only to make a better life for themselves and 
families back in their home countries.64 
The psychological effects of the bombing also seemed to have impacted multiple 
in-groups to include patriotic Bostonians, concerned Muslim-Americans, and those who 
felt the need to revisit the horror of 9/11, form their individual opinion, and express it 
explicitly. “This cover may have gotten people talking about Rolling Stones but it has 
hurt, again, the people of Boston and America’s law-abiding Muslim-American 
community.”65 Dzhakhar Tsarnaev, scheduled to go on trial on November 3, 2014, faces 
30 charges stemming from the Boston Marathon bombing. He faces the death penalty if 
convicted of committing a crime in which a WMD was used.  
The questions of why and how is the determination made of who is in charge 
were answered in that the Massachusetts State Police served as the lead local law 
enforcement and public safety organization agency for the UC structure developed as a 
requirement of the NIMS ICS.66 The question of how is an “all-hazards” response 
defined and whether it is different from a terrorism response was answered in that the 
bombing was initially recognized as an act of terrorism and the response and mitigation 
actions reflected the same. “It took 22 minutes from the time of the blast until the last 
victim was moved off the street into some kind of medical treatment.”67 Along with the 
measures taken to provide life-saving first aid to the injured runners and spectators in 
attendance, concurrently actions were taken that led to the timely identification of the 
suspected bombers. “While there was no direct intelligence, the threat of a terrorist attack 
always exists.”68  
The question of how planning and preparedness was performed for the Boston 
Marathon was answered in that logistics for the Boston Marathon began three months 
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before the event. “This year, marathon planning began in January.”69 Utilizing EM 
principles along with the NPG framework, which deploys resources, provided by the 
community, FEMA integrated the local efforts with the needed management component. 
“This incident also demonstrated how FEMA’s approach to National Preparedness helped 
to empower and strengthen the whole community, by giving its members the right tools 
and information they needed to be prepared.”70 In the aftermath of the bombing, a 
congressional committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs convened and 
produced the publication, “Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings: 
Preparing for and Responding to the Attack.” The report noted the importance of 
involving the community as a resource in the event of an act of terrorism.  
The question of why should social, political, and psychological consequence 
concerns be addressed was answered by the national and international attention the 
United States was subjected to in the aftermath of the bombing; notable was the decision 
to place Watertown on lockdown while the Tsarnaev brothers were being sought. Fueling 
political consequences were inquires of civil liberty violations from the decision of the 
lockdown.  
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V. CASE STUDY 3—WASHINGTON NAVY YARD SHOOTING 
On September 16, 2013, civilian contract employee Aaron Alexis reported for 
work by gaining entry onto the Washington Navy Yard utilizing his legally issued 
identification credentials. Over the next several hours, he would kill 12 co-workers in the 
second deadliest multiple mass shooting on a military facility. The killing spree ended 
when Alexis was shot and killed by law enforcement officers who had responded and 
some who were already at the Navy Yard assisting the armed security guards engaged in 
a gunfight with Alexis. This active shooter incident also involved fire service and 
emergency medical service first responder support resources to this law enforcement led 
incident. Law enforcement agencies in Washington, DC, are routinely in charge of active 
shooter incidents as they have the expertise, training, and more importantly, the firearms 
to counter an active shooter incident. This case study examines the following questions 
the researcher considers paramount in determining if gray areas exist between the EM 
and HS disciplines. 
 How and why is the determination made of who is in charge and when? 
 How is an “all-hazards” response defined—is it different from a terrorism 
response? 
 How is planning and preparedness performed? 
 Why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a 
concern?  
It is also noted the researcher served as a first responder, initially in command of 
DC Fire and EMS resources, and later, as a representative in the established UC post after 
being relieved by DC Fire and EMS Chief Kenneth B. Ellerbe. The question of who is 
charge was answered early, as contract security guards, along with the Naval District 
Washington Fire and Emergency Services Department stationed at the facility, were the 
first to be alerted, recognize the incident involved an active shooter, and establish a UC 
structure with law enforcement serving as the lead.  
Analyzing whether the active shooter incident at the Washington Navy Yard on 
September 16, 2013, should have been categorized as an act of terrorism because it 
involved the murder of 12 innocent Americans on U.S. soil or categorized as an act of 
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workplace violence committed by a disgruntled employee with a documented history of 
mental problems presents a challenge to both EM and HS disciplines. An independent 
panel commissioned by the responsible Pentagon included in its findings, “the 
department’s procedures to protect sensitive information and installations are outdated 
and must better take into accounts security threats posed by insiders.”71 HS discipline 
principles dictate that an incident of this nature is law enforcement led with support from 
other public safety-first responders, such as fire and rescue, to remove the victims from 
the secured warm zone to the waiting EMTs for triage, treatment, and transport. EM 
discipline principles dictate that this “all-hazards” emergency required a response from 
the same public safety-first responders but their actions may or may not be coordinated 
by law enforcement. What seemed to be agreed upon by the first responders to the 
shooting was addressing the immediate concern of establishing and developing a UC 
structure with clearly understood guidelines of authority and who was in charge. 
Categorizing the shooting as an “all-hazards” response is problematic based on the 
definition of both disciplines, and categorizing it as an act of terrorism is problematic 
because the shooting was not a perceived threat or an act committed that was provoked 
by a political agenda. While answers to what provoked Alexis to go on a killing rampage 
are still being sought, no indications have been put forth of a terrorist attack with a 
religious or political agenda targeting innocent Americans. Documented are accounts of 
an employee who had stated that he felt controlled by extremely low frequency (ELF) 
electromagnetic waves. 
Planning and preparedness by HS discipline principles favored law enforcement 
organizations occur throughout the nation with active shooter scenarios included in the 
training. These training sessions often include first responders from the fire service, 
emergency medical services, and EM disciplines, as each would be expected to serve in a 
support capacity to this law enforcement-led incident. The researcher noted the timely 
established UC structure at the Navy Yard shooting aided with the inherent 
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characteristics accountability, flexibility, and command and control as roles and 
responsibilities were recognized at the onset of this tragedy. No support agency first 
responders were injured during the random shooting rampage by Alexis or the return 
gunfire by law enforcement. Joint-training sessions attended by Naval District 
Washington Fire & Emergency Services Department hosted by DC Fire & EMS at its 
training academy provided for a well-executed operational incident action plan (IAP). 
The locations of the victims being held in Building 197, the site of the shootings, were 
known throughout the ordeal and allowed the quick removal of the injured once it was 
determined and confirmed that Alexis had been taken down by law enforcement. The hot-
zone initially established encompassed areas outside the Navy Yard, but it was reduced to 
the facility after it was determined that a wounded civilian had been assisted outside by a 
law enforcement officer who then returned inside. Receiving this information at the UC 
post aided in the determination that Alexis was the lone active shooter.  
Political fallout in the aftermath of the shooting ranged from military facility 
security to the biggest inquiry, which is still being raised—How was Alexis able to obtain 
credentials that allowed him access to the Washington Navy Yard? Investigations and 
inquires of Alexis’ military service, which ended in 2011, revealed that he was able to 
keep his secret clearance as a honorable discharged service member after his supervisor 
had recommended a general discharge, which thus prevented him from obtaining the job 
with the contractor, Experts, Inc. Politically, internal inquires came from the DOD that 
were shared publically regarding the number of secret clearances the department should 
be looking to decrease. Political-sensitive inquires of the fact that secret clearances are 
revisited at five-year intervals, or in some cases, are good for 10 years, were met with not 
so sensitive responses. Stan Soloway, president and chief executive of the Professional 
Services Council stated, “Security clearance reform has been needed for years and that 
continuous monitoring of cleared workers is absolutely critical.”72 He continued to say, 
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“We have a process that is so heavily dependent and focused on interviews and shoe 
leather.”73  
The questions of how and why the determination is made of who is in charge 
were answered in that the initial first responders to the Navy Yard established a UC 
structure consisting of the DC Fire & EMS Department, Washington Navy Yard Fire 
Department and the law enforcement agencies already on the scene or that arrived within 
minutes of the shooting. The question of how is an “all-hazards” response defined and is 
it different from a terrorism response was answered in that the initial responders to the 
Navy Yard deployed strategies and tactics that dictated an active shooter incident. This 
strategy promoted establishing command, setting up an incident command post, and a UC 
post for the incoming liaisons from the various agencies. This strategy was indicative of a 
terrorist attack response but it also allowed the shooting to be handled as an “all-hazards” 
incident, which by HS discipline principles, is an emergency that is not a natural or 
human-made disaster but required a management component. The question of planning 
and preparedness was addressed by the IAP developed by the UC during the incident, 
which contained the locations of the injured victims, logistics for first-responder’s safety 
while removing the injured victims, and tactics for confining the shooter to an area for 
capture. The question of why should social, political, and psychological consequences be 
a concern was answered by the numerous inquiries that were political in nature to include 
the process utilized by Alexis that allowed him to retain his clearance. “Alexis was given 
a ‘general discharge,’ a classification often used to designate a blemished performance 
record. In some cases, a general discharge can make it difficult to land a civilian job.”74  
                                                 
73 Londoño and Davenport, “Navy Yard Shooting Might Have Been Prevented, Pentagon Review 
Shows.” 
74 Theresa Vargas, Steve Hendrix, and Marc Fisher, “The Suspect: A Man of Share Contrasts,” 
Washington Post, September 17, 2013. 
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VI. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The research was conducted utilizing Case Study and Qualitative Analysis 
methodologies. The following cases were presented: Hurricane Katrina, the Boston 
Marathon bombing, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting. The case studies 
represented a contrast and comparison of a disaster as in the case of Hurricane Katrina, a 
natural disaster, and an act of terrorism, Boston Marathon bombing. The Washington 
Navy Yard shooting and Boston Marathon bombing were analyzed for contrast and 
comparison with a reference to domestic terrorism as they both occurred on U.S. soil. 
The case study responses were then analyzed using the following documents that 
compose the framework for this nation’s preparedness to a disaster, either natural or man-
made or an act of terrorism, in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery—NPG, PPD-8, Stafford Act–Title VI, HSA of 2002–Title V, and 
the QHSR. The EM and HS disciplines were then analyzed for JGAs between them that 
present consequences to national security.  
B. SETTING 
The setting for the study occurred in three locations. The setting for the Hurricane 
Katrina case study was New Orleans, Louisiana, during the landfall of Hurricane Katrina 
and the days after in which the levees failed, which left everything in their path 
vulnerable to flooding. The setting for the second case study was Boston, Massachusetts, 
in the aftermath of the bombs detonating near the finish line and the surrounding area in a 
neighborhood of Watertown. The third setting was the site of the Washington Navy Yard 
shooting in southeast Washington, DC.  
C. SAMPLE  
The sampling procedure utilized by the researcher was a purposive sample. 
Stakeholders from the EM and HS disciplines who had a role or responsibility in Katrina 
hurricane, the Boston Marathon bombing, or the Navy Yard shooting as a first responder, 
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decision maker, or policy maker represented the sample and participants. The document 
analyzed by the researcher was PPD-8. The gender, age, ethnicity, and social-economic 
status of the stakeholders from the disciplines were not variables for the study.  
D. MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS 
The researcher utilized an observation checklist matrix format to collect data. The 
purpose of the matrix was to analyze PPD-8, which represented the framework for U.S. 
preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and 
recovery for JGAs between EM and HS disciplines. The analytical themes produced from 
the matrix represented the qualitative data to support or refute consequences to national 
security resulting from JGAs. The validity of the matrix was measured by the themes that 
emerged in analyzing the document and the reliability was measured by the consistency 
in which the themes emerged.  
E. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 
The procedure utilized by the researcher to collect data for the study consisted of 
an analysis of the following questions from Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon 
bombing, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting case studies: a) how and why is the 
determination made of who is in charge and when? b) how is an “all-hazards” response 
defined—is it different from a terrorism response? c) how is planning and preparedness 
performed? and d) why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a 
concern? The results of the analysis were placed in the observation checklist matrix 
(Appendix). The purpose of the matrix was to examine the EM and HS disciplines for 
preparedness in the mission areas of PPD-8: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, 
and recovery for JGAs in the event of a natural or human-made disaster or an act of 
terrorism. The common themes and differences that emerged represented the data 
collection to support or refute a claim of consequences to national security that resulted 




Themes emerging from Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and 
the Washington Navy Yard shooting case studies represent the results. The qualitative 
findings from these questions are discussed in Chapter VIII. Preparedness in the PPD-8 
mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery represented 
the analysis tool utilized for the case study questions. Hurricane Katrina represented a 
natural disaster, whereas the Boston Marathon bombing, and the Navy Yard shooting, 
occurring on U.S. soil, by definition represented acts of domestic terrorism. The 
researcher considers the Washington Navy Yard shooting an act of workplace violence, 
however, as opposed to an act of domestic terrorism due to the absence of a political or 
religious motive for the shootings. Additionally, the researcher notes the well-
documented fact that Navy Yard shooter Aaron Alexis gained entry into the facility to 
commit his mass killing spree with his employee identification work credentials.  
B. EMERGING THEMES 
When analyzing how and why in the determination of who is in charge and when, 
the principles of NIMS, specifically ICS, emerged in the natural disaster, the act of 
domestic terrorism, and the act of workplace violence. ICS requires that an identified 
single incident commander (IC) or UC structure be established on all incidents. “The 
incident command organizational structure develops in a top-down, modular fashion that 
is based on the size and complexity of the incident, as well as the specifics of the hazard 
environment created by the incident.”75 While a natural disaster, such as Hurricane 
Katrina, creates a complex disaster due to the large geographical area impacted, an act of 
terrorism, such as the Boston Marathon bombing, and a workplace violence incident, 
such as the Washington Navy Yard shooting, seem to create more of a challenge in 
complexity due to the initial unknown number of victims, and initial unknown number of 
perpetrators. Hurricane Katrina responders and stakeholders were subjected to criticism 
                                                 
75 Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Command System, 10. 
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for the lack of addressing who was initially in charge and responsible for managing the 
disaster, which was in total contrast to the Boston Marathon bombing. This concern was 
addressed by a prepared IAP, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting, in which the 
UC’s IAP developed on the scene determined who was in charge.  
In analyzing “all-hazards,” the principles of the EM discipline indicate that 
planning and preparedness and response efforts for this type of emergency that is not a 
disaster, also requires a management component due to the amount of resources expected 
for mitigation. FEMA supported EM discipline principles traditionally prepared for and 
responded to disasters both natural and human-made utilizing the framework of the 
Stafford Act. Post 9/11 brought DHS supported HS discipline principles with a priority 
towards preparedness and response to terrorism. Also emerging was the application of 
preparedness efforts to an “all-hazards” emergency that commenced at the local level and 
was driven by the hazard assessment that indicated the type of incidents likely to occur in 
that community. Terrorism preparedness and response capabilities were not previously 
addressed because they failed to reach the top of the hazard assessment list in 
communities across the nation. Terrorism preparedness and response capabilities are now 
being addressed as an “all-hazards” emergency of national consequence requiring a 
management component.  
PPD-8 presented a paradigm of national preparedness with a holistic approach 
that commenced at the local level, which has been adopted by both disciplines. The HSA 
of 2002, from which PPD-8 evolved as the nation’s framework for preparedness in the 
mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery, takes into 
account that addressing the greatest threats to the United States should include both 
terrorism and disasters, both natural and human-made. Measures to have communities 
become self-sufficient until federal resources arrive to augment the local and state 
resources are now being addressed. “Emergency planning normally begins with the 
identification of the disasters that have occurred in a community in the past.”76  
                                                 
76 Waugh, “Terrorism and the All-Hazards Model. IDS Emergency Management,” 2. 
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Emerging from the analysis of planning and preparedness utilizing the framework 
of PPD-8 was the revelation that first responders and some key stakeholders were the 
same for EM and HS disciplines when it came to training.  
Joint training sessions in planning and preparedness included firefighters, law 
enforcement officers, and EMTs. Also to emerge was the realization that HS discipline 
principles placed a greater emphasis on law enforcement functions much like EM 
discipline principles place a greater emphasis on disasters, both natural and human-made. 
The categorization of terrorism as an “all-hazards” in terms of planning, preparedness, 
and response is supported more by HS discipline principles, which can be attributed to 
the greater need for law enforcement functions in the wake of an act of terrorism and 
ensuing investigation of this crime.  
Hurricane Katrina still today presents a national platform for a discussion on 
social injustice for the survivors and the millions who watched its devastation that floated 
bodies to the surface, which represented demographics of social-economic divide. “As 
conditions deteriorated in New Orleans, Americans were horrified at the scenes they were 
watching on television.”77 With 9/11 viewed as a nation caught off-guard by an 
unanticipated but predictable terrorist attack, Hurricane Katrina was seen as a nation 
caught off-guard again, this time by a predicted natural disaster. Hurricane Katrina had 
outcries of social-economic injustice in New Orleans, as many of its victims were unable 
to escape because it was the end of the month and they did not have money to pay for 
transportation out of the path of the on-coming disaster during the early stages. “Many of 
the residents on public assistance had run out of money.”78  
Political consequences from Hurricane Katrina included probing the lack of 
coordination by local, state and federal officials. “Despite knowledge that Katrina was a 
looming ‘nightmare scenario,’ DHS and Secretary Cheroff failed to adequately prepare 
the federal government for what became one of the most destructive natural disasters in 
                                                 
77 Kettl, System under Stress, 66. 
78 Ibid., 72. 
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the nation’s history.”79 Efforts at the state and local levels of government were equally 
inadequate. Politics surrounding Hurricane Katrina resulted in careers ending for some 
federal key decision makers involved in the failed planning, preparedness, mitigation, 
response, and recovery efforts to this natural disaster, most notably FEMA director 
Michael Brown. Psychological consequences of Hurricane Katrina’s survivors can be 
measured by tracking cases of individuals treated for psychological disorders resulting 
from the disaster, which was not a subject of the researcher’s study.  
In analyzing the Boston Marathon bombing utilizing the framework of PPD-8, 
this act of domestic terrorism seems to have presented political consequences also. 
Politics centered on assertions of the United States’ knowledge of bombing suspect 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s ties with Islamic radicals and failure to check further into the 
allegations by the U.S. intelligence community. Politically, this point of contention raised 
questions of irresponsibility by top FBI officials, which was downplayed by the bureau’s 
leader. “Three months after the bombing, then FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III said the 
bureau’s failure to share information about the elder Tsarnaev wasn’t important.”80 The 
daylong lockdown of the city added to the political fallout as critics including presidential 
hopeful (Ron Paul) spoke on the ineffectiveness of this tactic. It was noted that the 
brothers were located after the lockdown ended.  
                                                 
79 Kettl, System under Stress, 70. 
80 Susan Zalkind, “5 Myths about the Boston Marathon Bombing,” Washington Post, April 6, 2014, 
B2. 
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VIII. DISCUSSION  
EM and HS disciplines include many of the same key stakeholders. The internal 
stakeholders include fire service, law enforcement, and EMTs who represent the first 
responders to the scene of a disaster, both human-made or any “all-hazards” emergency 
along with government agencies that provide the policies that compose the planning, 
preparedness, response, and recovery framework. External stakeholders include non-
governmental organizations that provide support to the HS enterprise.  
A. CHALLENGES 
Some of the challenges presented for the stakeholders who are one in the same 
include an incident scene at which the question of identifying who is in charge becomes a 
dilemma, redundancy and duplication of on-scene efforts, a lack of clear guidelines for 
planning and preparedness, and the question of why should the social, political, and 
psychological consequences of a disaster or “all-hazards” be a concern. The Cold War era 
gave rise to the civil defense-led mission of community vigilance in the ’40s, ’50s, and 
’60s, to guard against foreign invasion, which gave way to the FEMA-led ’70s, ’80s, and 
’90s mission of preparedness and response to disasters, both natural and human-made, 
which gave way to the current HS discipline-led 21st century mission of protecting the 
homeland against the threat and acts of terrorism. A common theme of the primary 
mission of each era that continues today is community preparedness and response 
capability. The efforts of securing the homeland against disasters and emergencies starts 
in the community and each era realized whether it was a disaster or emergency it required 
management of the resources. It began as a local incident and based on the impacted 
community’s preparedness and capability to respond, it often represented the success or 
failure of mitigation. This theme was and is expected to be prevalent in the future 
regardless of whether the stakeholders of the EM or HS discipline lead the challenge of 
national security and resiliency for the United States.  
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The purpose of this case study and qualitative analysis research was to explore 
how JGAs between the disciplines have consequences on national security. The questions 
that represented the research are: a) what are the consequences to nation and how can 
they be resolved, b) does the JGA between EM and HS present a challenge for both 
disciplines in the preparedness areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and 
recovery, and c) does the JGA between Emergency Management and Homeland Security 
present a challenge for both disciplines for an “all-hazards” response. These questions 
were analyzed using Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the 
Washington Navy Yard shooting case studies with a set of questions that took into 
account three types of incidents: a disaster, an act of terrorism, and an act of workplace 
violence. PPD-8 served as the qualitative analysis instrument. The results represented the 
discussion for each of the three research questions analyzed as the study identified an 
important gap that could have consequences to national security.  
In taking a snapshot post 13 years 9/11, the pride and resiliency of the United 
States is on display with a complex framework for securing this nation. Adding to the 
complexity is how EM and HS discipline stakeholders define “all-hazards.” Stakeholders 
of both disciplines who respond to an “all-hazards” emergency have shared but 
sometimes redundant or competitive roles and responsibilities. The same can be found in 
preparedness efforts for an “all-hazards” emergency in which EM discipline principles 
primarily center on disasters, both natural and human-made, and HS discipline principles 
primarily center on terrorism. Having both disciplines collaborate and subscribe to a 
common definition of “all-hazards” emergency can reduce redundant competitive roles of 
responsibility in preparedness and response.  
Preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, 
and recovery revealed JGAs, as the EM and HS discipline principles seem to mirror each 
other while being implemented by two different agencies, which causes competing roles 





National Preparedness contain identical conceptual and practical components that are 
primary missions for both EM and HS disciplines. The FEMA-regulated Stafford Act 
provides a systematic approach to emergency preparedness in the same manner as the 
HSA of 2002-regulated PPD-8 addresses national preparedness. Having both disciplines 
working from opposite ends of the spectrum creates problems with coordination. 
“Homeland security involves so many different agencies performing so many different 
functions, that drawing clear lines is difficult.”81 Coordination issues that promote 
competing roles and responsibility, which thus creates redundancy, are far more prevalent 
than issues of performing different functions when examining the EM and HS discipline 
principles. When examining HS, its primary mission is to protect the nation against the 
threat and acts of terrorism, which is now challenged by expanding its scope in “an 
attempt to combine and collect the entire array of safety, security, and emergency 
readiness under collective effort. And as such, it has also become a term of discord.”82  
The HSA of 2002, which realigned the federal government and placed FEMA 
under the DHS, can be seen as a contributor of this JGA that can have consequences to 
national security. “In the act creating the department, Congress resolved the question of 
which agencies ought to be included with relative speed.”83 Coordination between the 
DHS agencies, which also includes FEMA, is seen as a challenge that until resolved will 
allow JGAs to exist. Removing FEMA from the DHS would be counter-productive, as 
the EM and HS discipline principles will inherently bring collaboration between them. 
“The new, spun-off FEMA would still have to work closely with the homeland security 
elements that remained inside DHS, or it would separate DHS emergency planning from 
the major agency responsible for carrying out the response.”84  
Another potential consequence to national security can result from JGAs between 
EM and HS disciplines because the stakeholders are one in the same, which presents a 
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challenge in determining who is in charge. In determining who is in charge of a disaster 
or emergency of national consequence, NIMS, specifically ICS, presents a modular top-
down management tool that identifies a single incident commander or a UC for the 
incident. The first responders of fire, law enforcement, and emergency medical service 
also use this incident management tool for training to plan and prepare in the mission 
areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The lessons learned 
from Hurricane Katrina highlighted the importance of identifying who is in charge early 
into the incident, as without this imperative component of NIMS being addressed by 
implementing ICS at either the local, state, or federal level, it can result in key decision-
making processes going unaddressed. The Boston Marathon bombing and Washington 
Navy Yard shooting implemented the ICS component of NIMS, which enhanced 
accountability and safety for the first responders to both incidents. Stakeholders who 
represent both disciplines should be on one accord in addressing who is in charge.  
B. LIMITATIONS 
The researcher’s decision to expand the study from qualitative analysis 
methodology to include case study methodology proved to be a limitation on the time to 
collect, analyze, and report the findings and results. The decision to present each of the 
three case studies; Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the 
Washington Navy Yard shooting, as an independent chapter to the study was also a 
limitation due to time constraints. The contrast and comparison analysis between 
disasters, both natural and human-made and terrorism utilizing the questions from the 
three case studies, which were then analyzed by the PPD-8 matrix, added to the time 
constrains for collecting, analyzing, and reporting these results and findings utilizing the 





Other limitations were related to the sensitivity of the data collected and 
theoretical sensitivity. The researcher served in a decision-making capacity during the 
Washington Navy Yard shooting and sharing the data collected for this study during an 
on-going investigation presented a challenge to limitation. The data collected and shared 
for the study concerning the Washington Navy Yard shooting case study was limited with 
respect to the victims and their love ones, as well as the on-going investigation. The 
researcher’s experience as a chief officer in the fire service can be viewed as bias for the 
Washington Navy Yard case study in the same fashion as ethnographic research 
conducted by one serving in the same profession. Also, having the researcher serving in a 
decision-making capacity for the Washington Navy Yard shooting can be viewed as bias 
with respect to collecting, reporting, and more importantly, sharing of the data. 
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Based on the results, the following recommendations are presented. Both EM and 
HS discipline stakeholders must undertake measures in the area of reducing the 
vulnerability of the United States to threats and acts of terrorism collectively, which can 
be accomplished in many ways, such as consensus-reaching stakeholder forums and joint 
training in PPD-8 that includes first responders of the public safety organizations and 
community citizenry. Research in the area of identifying the differentness between 
domestic terrorist and foreign terrorist presents intriguing research for the stakeholders of 
both disciplines. While the focus has been on stopping potential terrorists from coming 
into the United States to commit acts of terrorism, domestic homegrown terrorists will 
continue to commit acts of terrorism on the homeland. American-born radicalized 
citizens, such as the Boston Marathon bombers, lived in this nation’s backyard 
undetected until they took the lives and injured innocent participants and spectators of a 
race. Domestic terrorist must be identified and stopped before the act of terrorism is 
committed.  
Measures that support HS as a recognized discipline must be undertaken. The 
acceptance of EM as a discipline recognized by academic and industry came years after 
its stakeholders had performed the management tasks of mitigation in numerous natural 
disasters. Sustainability of HS is critical because EM discipline stakeholders view this 
evolving discipline as a competitor as opposed to an ally. Research that addresses the 
gaps in national security created by the JGAs between EM and HS is warranted, as 
potential terrorists will continue to seek the path of least resistance in committing acts of 
terrorism to kill and injure innocent victims on U.S. soil.  
Another area for future research is addressing the mental status of a person who 
erupts in an unprovoked killing spree of innocent victims on U.S. soil. Prior to the 
Washington Navy Yard shooting spree by Aaron Alexis, mass killing incidents occurred 
in the United States, such as the mass killings on the Fort Hood military base in 2009 by 
Major Nidal Hassan, and the Aurora, Colorado movie shooting by James Holmes on July 
20, 2012. In both incidents, the shooter used a legally registered firearm. Research in the 
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area of identifying these potential “terrorists” whether they are employees, students, or 
everyday citizens, is recommended and should include more stringent measures to keep 
firearms out of their possession.  
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X. CONCLUSIONS 
Three conclusions were drawn from this research that can have implications to 
national security as a result of JGAs between the EM and HS disciplines. The first is in 
not making a decision of who is in charge in the event of a disaster, either natural or 
human-made or an incident of national consequence; it can negatively impact first 
responders and other key stakeholders. Major incidents in which multiple local, state, and 
federal resources will be deployed for mitigation require clear lines of authority that start 
with identifying who is in charge. The implication for not having this concern addressed 
can be devastating, such as in the case of Hurricane Katrina. First responders and other 
key stakeholders to an incident where the question of who is in charge has not been 
addressed can find themselves operating on a scene at which a duplication of efforts may 
occur with a higher probability that some critical tasks will not be identified or addressed 
in a timely fashion, which may prolong mitigation all together.  
The ICS component of NIMS provides a top-down model to manage an incident 
that would require a multidiscipline, multiagency, and multijurisdictional response, thus 
addressing this problem. The UC structure would allow the different agencies from 
different disciplines, and jurisdictions to operate together with equal authority given to 
each agency or jurisdiction represented. This command structure would also inherently 
provide accountability for all first responders to the incident with unity of command, 
which identifies a supervisor for all on-scene personnel, and more importantly, the single 
IC or unified structure of command would identify who is in charge of the incident. 
The second conclusion drawn from this research that can have implications to 
national security is the absence of a consensus agreed upon definition of “all-hazards” by 
the EM and HS disciplines. Both internal and external stakeholders must agree on the 
definition, which will in turn, promote better on-scene management. The traditional 
response of the EM discipline addressed a disaster, either natural or human-made, and 
any other incident was considered an “all-hazards” emergency, including an act of 
terrorism. 9/11 gave the United States a wake-up call, which produced the HSA of 2002 
with a top priority of reducing the vulnerability to the threat of terrorism and the 
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framework for a national response to terrorism on the homeland. Having a consensus on 
the definition of “all-hazards” will allow the disciplines to operate in unison, as the 
expectations of both will be agreed upon. This consensus-built collaboration model can 
also be used in planning and preparing for an “all-hazards” incident and should include 
joint training by all disciplines expected to respond to an “all-hazards” emergency or 
incident. 
The third conclusion drawn from this research that can have implications to 
national security is the failure to acknowledge and address political, social, and 
psychological consequences of a major disaster, either natural, such as Hurricane Katrina, 
or human-made, or a major incident of national consequence, such as the Boston 
Marathon bombing. In the case of psychological effects of an act of terrorism, other types 
of traumatic events in which the lost of life and devastation was great must also be 
reviewed to provide parameters to address this concern. With evolving technology in 
communications, such as video equipped cell phones, social implications will be more 
media driven. By bringing the impact of the incident to those not directly affected, the 
media can present the “worst of the worst” in suffering to the non-affected population, 
and thus, shape the perception of the government and its role of responsibility. This 
approach can potentially lead to political issues that can reach far from the local 
community where the response initially occurred to the national arena with consequences 
for those with a role in policy adoption and a responsibility as a government accountable 
official or employee.  
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APPENDIX. CASE STUDIES QUALITATIVE MATRIX 
Qualitative Matrix 
Case Studies: 
Hurricane Katrina (August 29, 2005)  
Boston Marathon bombing (April 15, 2013) 
Washington Navy Yard shooting (September 16, 2013) 
 
Area of Analysis–PPD-8 for Emergency Management (EM) and Homeland Security 
(HS) 
Area of Analysis–Natural Disaster/Domestic Terrorism/Workplace Violence 
 
Discipline—recognized domain in academia and industry 
Jurisdictional—range of authority 
Gray area—ambiguity supporting theoretic and applied differences in policy and 
procedure 














How and why is the determination 
made of who is in charge and 
when? 
   
How is an “all-hazards” response 
defined—is it different from a 
Terrorism response? 
   
How is planning and preparedness 
performed? 
   
Why should social, political, and 
psychological consequences be a 
concern? 
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